Fr. Malachi Martin - Bishop & Cardinal?!!

Read St. Augustine. He gives examples. Moral theologians give examples. Why are you making this about me? I am irrelevant. I am not a doctor of the Church. And I am not an instrument of the Magisterium.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/35354/pg35354-images.html

2389. Lying.—A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what is not true.

(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign consisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by language, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by expressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).

(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is found in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of mendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.

(c) A lie is told with purpose; that is, there is a comparison by the intellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice of the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious person, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie. Moreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear understanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his efforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who do not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or inaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of indirect lying.

(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the pretense that what is not in one’s mind is in one’s mind. Just as truth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the disagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely false, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as a half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give support to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to throw dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.

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2392. Classification of Lies.—Every lie is harmful from its nature, since it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of society. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil, and hence we have the following classes of lies.

(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to please (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies include all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and descriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by one who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way (e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors have a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken seriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are told with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may receive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to good conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a despondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his spirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various statements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi. 2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).

(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to indulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying (lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person (pernicious lies).

2393. Motives for Lying.—The motives for lying are not always simple, and it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several motives of different character.

(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence. It may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of another in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when the liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g., when the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).

(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may affect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius calumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of Caius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the truth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards Balbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.

2394. Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.—(a) Lies of exaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in both cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to overstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration is worse.

(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the harm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is that which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and the lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that harms in temporal things only.

(c) Lies are mitigated by the purpose to help, and the greater the good intended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious are not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than jocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are not so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a less evil to lie in order to save a man’s life than to lie in order to take his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the shock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it is a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie in order to prevent a financial loss.

2395. Sinfulness of All Lies.—But though lies are unequal in sinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are called fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest good (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does not justify the means.

(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs given by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an unfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly relations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the proper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have regarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and even those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called liars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7; Levit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and St. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point: “Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor, for we are members one of another.” The Fathers and the theologians are generally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death, excuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could approve of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith in His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who helps to deceive us even in a small matter.

(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be only a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one’s mind is not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is not necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be denied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not regard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose and officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and as the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial; but some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one lies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render them mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of untruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.

2396. When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.—Lies are sometimes free from all formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or uninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great difficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of certain defectives who seem to be born liars).

 

I enjoyed your wee contribution Brian lol. It made me chuckle.

 

Much of what you say is true, but I don't agree with your conclusions. Organisations like the CIA are set up to counter individuals or organisations with the intent to harm the state, usually using methods of secrecy and deception. The notion of protecting reputations and avoiding causing harm doesn't seem to necessarily apply. A state could take a rigorous view of the issue and not deploy such deceptive methods. It would more than likely be subverted and conquered by its less scrupulous enemies. That the CIA might be involved now in illegal and immoral over-reach, which I think it is, does not imply that it does not have defensive purposes which are moral. It is arguable that a state would be negligent in the protection of its citizens if it didn't involve itself in such unpleasantness.

You have also taken a leap and made the conclusion in your last paragraph that all lying is 'mortal sin'. All lying that involves swearing an oath and committing perjury is mortally sinful, but Pope Innocent didn't say all lying is mortally sinful, nor does the Church at present, nor at any time that I am aware. This is not my opinion, but what I believe to be the facts. It is your opinion that those declarations of Pope Innocent are rigorous. That is your opinion, it is not mine, because the Church has made no exceptions for the error of rigorism, which Pope Alexander VIII condemned in 1690. Pope Innocent wasn't being rigorous in those statements, he was taking that moderate view that has always been taken by the Church, but you yourself are taking a rigorous interpretation of what he said, applying it to situations that Pope Innocent did not intend. Conflating all lying into grave matter, as you seem to do, compounds this further.

I also have to pick on your assertion that just because CIA officers know they are lying implies full knowledge on their part. It doesn't. They would have to have full knowledge of the theology that you are quoting and have to possess the identical theological interpretation of it as you take in order to fulfil that criterion.

 

The ends never justify the means. As the quotes and references I provided should prove, the Roman Catholic Church thinks that lying is "intrinsically evil, and the end does not justify the means." (Moral Theology, Callan and McHugh, 2395).

And no where did I say that "all lying is mortally sinful." Here is what I did say,

"And the culpability for mortal sin depends on the three factors that all mortal sins depend on. Yes, people who objectively lie but do not realize it, are not committing mortal sin. But that is not the situation with covert intelligence officers. They know they are lying. They are trained to do it."
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If you think trained lying of the type that covert intelligence officer in the field would be required to do is not done with "full knowledge," you are kidding yourself. The precept against lying is part of the Natural Law known to all men with the use of the rational faculty. These people do not have to be catechized Catholics to know what lying is and that it is wrong to lie. They know they don't like it when people lie to them, so they should not do it to others. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

Again, you are arguing not against me but against the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.

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You’re very quick to accuse, aren’t you? You’ve condemned many members of the CIA and now you’re accusing me of heresy.

Thankfully, nobody will be judged by you.

I’m no longer going to continue this exchange. You might see this as a victory for yourself. Good for you.

 

I’m addressing this to the floor, so to speak, because I’m not communicating with PNF any longer. But he does raise some difficult questions.

We all know the dilemma of someone being put in a spot and finding he has to tell what is commonly known as a ‘white lie’, in order to avoid what would or could be a greater harm. In absolute terms, this person has committed a sin, albeit a venial one. But, is the person committing the lie with full consent? It’s really a case of heads or tails, he loses. If one is forced to do something wrong because a gun has been put to one’s head, does this not mitigate the sin? If one has no choice but to tell a lie to the Gestapo at the door, in order not to betray the Jews in one’s attic, is this not a figurative example of having a gun, perhaps not to one’s own head, but to someone else’s?

Maybe, we are all wrong and such people should have all avoided lies. People would have died, but sin would have been avoided. Is this what the Church prescribes?